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IN THE SUP.REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RL\ILEDG-E (Tl~1\NllT~I ANl) 
1\llXlXO C()J~PC>RAri,[ON and 
ICENN1~1,J1 J. 1\icCOllnllUl(, 
P l a.i n tiff s-A ppellants, 
vs 
FEDERAL RESOURCES 
CORPQR.ATION and 
HECla\ ~I ll\IXG CO~li> ANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 9604 
APPEL·LANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I. 
ALL POINTS RAISED ON APPE.AL WERE 
RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT. 
Respondents, in their brief, make various statements 
·as to what appellants did or did not do ~n the lower Court, 
which are not supported by the record, and· with which 
Appellants disagree including: 
(a) From 1955 to 1960 "appellants have under-
stood the basis upon which their royalty payments 
are being computed; they accepted the said pay-
ments without objecting or suggesting that the 
royalty payments were improperly co1nputed (R. 
15) ." (Respondents' brief 10.) 
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The reference to R. 15 i~ to respondents' o'vn answer~ 
the allegations of 'vhich as a rnatter of law are denied 
(lTRCP 8( d)). 
The deposition of !IcCormick (D64-65) shows that 
the basis for payment 'vas not investigated until 1960 
and suit was brougt in 1961. 
(b) "In their brief, a1}pellants contend, although 
they raiJsed no such objection before the District 
Court, that the meaning of the royalty clause in 
question is so elear and unambiguous" that the 
court may not look to parol evidence. (Respond-
ents' brief 11). 
This p·I"oposition \\Tas the very basis of appellants' 
1notion for su1nmary judgment and memorandum in sup-
port thereof (Tr. 177). 
(c) "Ap~pellants contend that this ruling by the 
court differentiates their royalty interest 'vith 
regard to royalties paid and royalties to be paid, 
. . . The court's rulin,g is in accord with the de-
claratory judgm.ent sought in their complaint." 
(Respondents' brief 25-26) 
Appellants' sought an accounting, judgment and de-
claratory judgment all based upon gross proceeds (Tr. 
2-3). 
(d) "No contention was raised by ap·pellants 
that they 'vere entitled to royalties on vanadium 
contained in ore proce~ssed. '' 
Many interrogatories and answers thereto are in the 
record involving this issue ( Tr. 163). 
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f) 
f) 
~he co1nplaint ~PPks '~an accounting of the gross 
proceeds of the sale of ore frorn said claims." ('Tr. 2) 
rrhi~ is not lilnited, nor 'vas it intended to be limited to 
uraniuu1. Further1nore the c-ourt \\·as advised during the 
argtunent that vanadilnn royalties \\rere claimed. 
(e) H No contention was raised by appPllants that 
... respondents should not be allo\ved to deduct 
development allowances paid by lT rani urn Reduc-
tion Company." (Respondents' brief 30.) 
'The language of the co1np~laint covers ~·gross pro-
ceeds of the sale'' (Tr. 2) "rhich appellants then and no"· 
COntend includes fictitiOUS developlllPnt allo,vances; and 
the lo\Yer court 'vas so advised, not only by the corn plaint, 
but also in the argument. 
(f) "No contention was raised by appellants that 
... appellants had not received full payment of 
royalties based on Circular 5 prices" (Respond-
ents' brief 30.) 
The complaint s.eeks "an accounting of the gross 
proceeds." (Tr. 2) How much more explicit s'hould it be? 
(g) uA full transcript of the hearing on appel-
lants' motion, which is not available because of 
a misunderstanding by counsel as to what aspects 
of the hearing were being reported, would clearly 
sho'v that the only point relied on by appellants 
to establish their rig·ht to an accounting was that 
their royalty payments should be computed" on 
selling price received. (Respondents' brief 30.) 
There 'vas no "misun.derstanding" as to a reporter. 
It was stipulated the reporter need not take the argument. 
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4 
If respondents jntended to rely upon so1ne suppDsed 
concessions ·or abandonn1ents hy appellants during their 
argument (which appellants deny were made) they should 
have pTepared a statement of the proceedings as a part 
of the record, in accordance "~ith UR,CP 75 (1n). 
(h) ''That appellants considered a determina-
tion of this single question to he disposition of the 
case is shown by" their n1emorandum. (Respond-
ents' brief 30.) 
Appellants' motion was not directed to whether or 
not there should be an accounting, but rather what the 
basis of an accounting should be. Had appellants pre-
vailed, the case would not have been over; the respond-
ents would still have had to account. Thus, just as pointed 
~out in our brief as to respondents' motion, neither mo-
tion if granted s,hould have terminated the case. The 
issues not before the court were not argued in the memo-
randum. The questions as to vanadiu1n payments, de-
velop•ment allowances and completeness of accounting 
were intentionally not submitted on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, and could not prop·erly have been decided 
on summary judgment because the record thereon is in-
adequate. These questions should be decided by the 
lowe.r court ~at a trial. 
But respondents' contention does not follow that 
appellants, by asserting that they are entitled to a sum-
mary judgment on one point, thereby \\yaive all other 
points on which no such motion is made. URCP 56(a) 
expressly provides for a summary judgment "upon all 
or any part" of a case. 
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5 
(i) The {)Illy contention raised by appellants' 
Inotion to arnend the judg~nPnt "'was that app·el-
lants should be entitled to elect to have their 
royalty pa~,.Inents'' based upon concentrated ore 
prices less milling costs for all royalty payments, 
past and future, rather than having different 
bases for past and future. (Respondents' brief 31.) 
It \Vould indeed be a novel rule if appellants "'"aived 
any point not set out in a motion to amend, as respond-
ents seem to contend. 
The court, while making his ruling, was informed by 
respondents' counsel that their motion \Vas for a "sum-
Inary judg1nent rather than for no cause of action" ( Tr. 
211), to no avail. 
The motion to amend was rnade pursuant to URrCP 
59 (e), because appellants thought that the judgment was 
at variance \Yith the court's oral ruling in this one par-
ticular only and that it therefore did not reflect the 
court's intention as reflected by the following record: 
• 'Mr. Lewis : I think it should provide, Your 
Honor, that that determination for future can only 
be made with resp·ect to future ores, not past ores. 
HThe Court: "\Vell, it is identical, isn't it~ 
"l\Ir. Lewis: 'Vhat I mean is they shouldn't 
be able to elect no\v to treat ores that were mined 
and sold months ago - to pay their share of 
processing. 
"The ·Court: Is there any difference~ Isn't it 
identical, penny for penny, up to no\\r ~ 
''l\Ir. Benson: Yes. 
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"l\Ir. Le"·is: Perhaps it is. 
HThe Court: If he 111akes his election no\v on 
how he takes, that 'vill bind hi1n hereafter. Will 
you dra\V findings I can sign' 
HMr. r_Je\\ris: Yes, Your I-Ionor." ('Tr. 212) 
Appellants ·agree with the general proposition argued 
by respondents that issues not tried in the lo,ver court 
cannot be presented on appeal. rrhe fallacy in respond-
ents' position is that such proposition is in applicable 
here because: 
1. The issues \vere presented. 
2. The record shows they were presented. 
3. Respondents having prevailed on their motion 
for summary judgment ''have the burden of es-
tablishing the lack of a triable issue of fact upon 
a record.'' - 6 Moore's Federal Practice 2364. 
4. There was no waiver of issues. 
5. There is no record of any waiver. 
All of the cases, except two cited by respondents to 
the effect that issues m~ay not be raised for the first time 
on appeal, are based upon the fact that the pleadings 
did not raise the issues. That is not true here. 
One exception is the dicta in Drummond v. Union 
Pacific Railro.ad Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P 2d 903, 
relied on by respondents, that the court would not con-
sider new issues. This was in a case in which Mr. Justice 
Latimer saw a point not seen by appellate counsel even 
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7 
on appeal, 'vhich thP appellate eonrt proper}~· said it 
w·ould not rule upon. 
The othPr exception is in Ricer Plate & Brazil Con-
ferences v. Pre.~.,·sed Steel Car (/onlpal(lJ, 2~7 F 2d 60 (2d 
Cir. 1955) 'vhich "·a~ a ea~f1 in \\'"hich a snnunary judg-
Iuent \Yas granted defendant because plaintiff, in order 
to recover had to ~ho"'" board approval of the contracts 
in question "·hich plaintiff did not sho"'"· The defendant 
produced the contracts \vhich showed on their face they 
",.ere not approved. The record showed that plaintiff 
"can1e for\\·ard 'vith nothing to co1nbat the obvious con-
clusion that the Board never ap~proved any agreement." 
On appeal plaintiff asserted there in fact had been an ap-
proval. The court rightly held that such assertion came 
too late. But that is not similar to the case at bar. In 
that case there \vas no question as to whether otheT is-
sues \vere waived, but rather whether new evidence re-
lating to the very point decided on snnrmary judgment 
could be considered for the first time on ap~peal. In the 
case at bar, appellants are not asserting that the Supreme 
c·ourt should consider additional evidence on the point 
as to whether or not defendants' smnmary judgment 
sl~o~d have b~en granted, but rather appellants are as-
serting that on the record the summary judgment as to 
the basis of accounting was wrong, and that such a ruling 
",.as not dispositive of all the issues inthe case. Thus this 
case is_ not in point. 
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POINT II. 
THE ROYALT'Y IS NOT BASED UPON "NET 
SMELTER OR 1\III.JL RETURNS," BUT UPON 
"GROSS PROC'EEDS OF SALE." 
As pointed out in apvellants' brief ( 3), any question 
which existed in the record title as to whether the royalty 
should be based upon "gross proceeds of sale'' as origin-
ally reserved, or upon "net smelter or mill returns" as 
recited in a subsequent assignment was resolved by the 
adoption of the ''gross proceeds of sale'' language, and 
the rejection of the ''net smelter or mill returns" lan-
guage by defendants' attorney when agreeing with plain-
tiffs' predecessor on the basis of the royalty. 
Despite this, defendants still argue that the royalty 
is a "net smelter or mill return" royalty. (Respondents' 
brief 12, 19.) 
Even if there had been no subsequent agreement be-
tween the parties resolving the existing problem in the 
record, this argument is untenable for two reasons: 
The first reason is as follows. The recitation of 
"net mill or smelter return'' is found in the assignment 
from Pryor and Deniel to U. & I. lTraniwn Inc. and it 
provides: 
"Whereas, the undersigned o\\rners and 1ocat-
ors by contract deed transferred the title thereto 
to one Melvin D. Rueckhaus, as Trustee (for di-
verse others owners) but subject to a reserved 
royalty to tihe undersigned of 15% of the net mill 
or smelter returns from any and all ore to be 
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9 
thereafter shipped or produced fron1 said mining 
ground, and to be paid the said undersigned o'vn-
en~. '' 
The granting language in said assignn1ent is as fol-
lo,vs: 
~~For and in consideration of One Dollar, and 
other valuable consideration a~ hereinhef.orP re-
ferred to, the under:signPd herPby a~sign, set over 
and transfer to 1 T. & l. lT raniun1 Inc. one-third 
of the royalty they V{ere to receive under said 
Rueckhause agreement." (Tr. 31) 
There is no question that the royalty 'vhich Pryor 
and Daniel had 'vas a gT10Ss and not a net royalty. The 
instru1nent creating it is before the ·Court and it so states. 
The granting language is broad enough to transfer the 
royalty interest \\~h0ther it \\~a~ gross or net. 
In construing docu1nents the granting language takes 
precedence over language contained in recitals. 16 An1. 
Jur. Deeds 241 . 
.. A.n erroneous recital does not affect the operation of 
the assignment. Blackburn v. Pond Creek Coal & £,and 
Co., ______ Ky. ______ , 287 S.W. 2d 610. 
The assignment to U. & I. does not create a situation 
111 which there was granted only a net royalty. As a 
matter· of construction the error in the recital should be 
disregarded by the court, the true factual situation should 
be recognized (that the royalty was gross, not net) and 
the assignment 'vould thus be effective to transfer the 
gross royalty 'vhieh existed. 26 C.J.S. Deeds 26. 
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10 
Plaintiffs can therefore rely on the chain of title 
starting \vith Pryor and Daniel. 
The second reason is as follows: U. & I. Uraniuu1 
Company 1nerged into defendant Federal lT rani urn Com-
pany. lT. & I. Uranium ·Company assigned to plaintiffs' 
predecessor, l\fcCormick, a gross royalty. If there \vas no 
gross royalty to assign but rather only a net, then plain-
tiffs' predecessor would have breached its implied war-
ranty that the thing assigned exists. 
"An assignor of a right, by assignment under 
seal or for value, warrants to the assignee, in the 
absence of circumstances showing a contrary in-
tention ... (b) that the right, as assigned, actually 
exists and is subject to no limitations or defenses 
other than those stated or apparent at the time 
of the assignment.'' 1 American Law Institute 
Restatement Contracts, 175 (l). 
Defendant would be es·topped to assert the non 
existence of that which it warranted existed. 
POINT III. 
THE PRICE UNDER THE URC PURCHASE 
AGREEMEN'T IS NOT AL"\VAYS EQUAL TO CIRCU-
LAR 5 PRICE PL·US ~fiLLING CO·STS. 
In their statement of facts, respondents assert that 
the purchase agreement entered into between them and 
URC provides for a sale at a price equal to Circular 5 
selling price plus milling charges. No citation of the 
r·ecord is given ·to support such a statement. None can be 
given. The statement could not be true when processing 
charges vary at least with the following: 
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11 
(a) Average hourly lahor cost at the plant ( Tr. 7G, 
reverse side). 
(b) Chentical cost index (':rr. 76, reverse side). 
(c) A calciuut carbonate penalty \\·hich varies \\~ith 
a Hne\v effeetive plant date" (Tr. 77), 
and the sales price varies \vith the foll·o\\-ing: 
(a) The ~·cost of ore fed to process'' 'vhich varied 
'vith a ne\\~ effective plant date'' (Tr. 88, re-
verse side). 
There are no such provisos in Circular 5. 
POINT IV. 
CIRCULAR 5 PRI·CES ARI~~ NOT CONTROL-
LING. 
Respondents assert that Circular 5 prices for ra'v 
ore control regardless of the royalty p·rovision for~' gross 
proceeds of sale." (Respondents' brief 13.) ·This asser-
tion is based upon three reasons which we shall discuss. 
1. Respondents assert that provisions in the royalty 
agree1nent refer to bonuses or premiums, transportation 
and dev~lopment allowances, and ore depot or purchaser, 
\V'hich are tenns used in Circular 5; and conclude there-
from that Circular 5 prices govern. (Respondents' brief 
14.) 
This is a non-sequitur. If the parties had intended 
Circular 5 prices to control, they 'vould have harl at least 
a reference thereto. 
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2. Resp~ondents argue that since C~ircular 5 provides 
"the tern1 'ore' does not include 1nill tailings or other 
mill products," that definition controls. (Respondents' 
brief 1±.) But it 'vould he more reasonable to argue that 
the ,v,ord "ore'' "~as used a~ a \YOr<l of art in ·Circular 5, 
which, by the definition therein contained, could include 
or exclude any ite1n; or to argue that, since AEC found it 
necessary to exclude 1nill products, ''ore'' "Tould other-
wise have ohad its usual meaning, which includes mill 
products. 
3. Respondents argue that it is impr.obable that 
the parties intended that royalty payments should be 
based upon the price of concentrated ore since "there 
were no mills to which ore from the Radon ~lining Claims 
could be sold until 1957, and since it 'vas not until the 
Ato1nic Energy Act of 1954 '':as passed and a mill con-
structed in 1957" that ti tie could be retained through 
the milling process. (Respondents' brief 1-!.) 
Respondents don ''t point out ho'v this state1nent is 
supported by the record. lTranium ore had been milled 
for several years. The record, in fact, shows that as early 
as 1951 AEC Circular 6 in p;roviding for bonus payments, 
provided "Ores for which payments 'viii be made must 
have been delivered to and paid for by either a station 
or mill'' ( T·r. 39) and lists as qualified mills the follo,ving 
on tihe Colorado plateau and vicinity: 
United States Vanadium Company, Uravan, Colo. 
United States \Tanadium Con1pany, Rifle, ·Colo. 
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1') .) 
Cli1nax l~ ranilun L1o., (;rand Junction, C·olo. 
, .. anadilnn (jorporation of AuH~riC'a, Durango, Colo. 
, .. anadilnn Corporation of .. :\1nerica, X aturita, Colo. 
\ .. anadilun ·Corporation of America, Hite, Utah. 
\.,.itro Chemical Co., 600 \V-est 33rd St., South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 
But \Yhether or not there 'vere in fact mills on the 
Colorado Plateau \Yhich \Yere milling ore seems immateri-
al, ~ince there \\Tould certainly be no presumption that 
the parties assumed that no 1nill 'vould accep·t ore for 
processing Inerely because no mill had yet done so. 
Furthern1o-re, even if it be assumed there were no 
Inills, the letter from Federal Uranium setting out the 
~·gross proceeds of sale" royalty provision 'vas 'v-ritten 
in 1955, after the passage of the 1954 act 'vhich respond-
ents construe as authorizing such retention of title. 
The following are additional reasons why Circular 
5 prices are not controlling: 
If they were to control, the parties would have said 
so. 
Circular 5 only provides a guaranteed minimum price 
for the type of ore covered. X o maximum is set. 
Circular 5 ap·p·lies specifically to only two types of 
ore: carnotite and roscoelite ( Tr. 37). The ore from the 
Radon claims is neither. 
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Circular 5 relates only to deliveries at I\Ionticello, 
Utah (Tr. 37). Surely the parties would presume there 
could he a different marketing place in the future. 
Circular 1, 'vhich became effective in 1948, set a guar-
anteed minimu1n price for "do1nestic refined uranium, 
high grade uranium bearing ores and mechanical con-
centrates.'' It, and other circulars covering other mini-
mtun prices, could have been more within the contempla-
tion of the parties than Circular 5 which covers ore of 
types not found in the Radon claims. 
Circular 5 was amended on various occasions. If it 
were to control, the agreement of royalty should also 
change. We doubt respondents 'vould make sueh a con-
tention. 
The royalty l~anguage provides the royalty "shall 
be paid by the ore depot or purchaser directly to you" 
(Tr. 49). This shows that a sale to a government ore 
buying depot is not the only sale contemplated. 
Circular 5 expired on March 31 of this year. If it 
controlled, there would be no present agreement on 
royalty. We again doubt respondents would so oontend. 
'The other alternative contention, that expired Cir-
cular 5 prices should control, 'vould be ridiculous. 
A simple change in the 1narket 'vhereby prices for 
uranium ore fall below these old Circular 5 prices (as 
well might occur, particularly after 1966) 'vould quickly 
change respondents assertion that it 'vould be harsh and 
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unfair to apply anything but prices set by said regulation. 
Circular 5 was not followed by respondents in mar-
keting the ore, and had nothing to do with the proceeds 
of sale actually received. 
Respondents have treated Cireular 5 as not control-
ling, since Circular 5 provided for vanadiu1n pay1.nents, 
yet respondents, except for a brief p·eriod, have not even 
kept records upon 'vhich to compute vanadiu1n royalties. 
The judgment which respondents seek to uphold also 
ignores this provision for vanadium. 
·Circular 5 applied only to uranium and vanadium, 
yet the royalty covers all ores ""'hich might occur. 
POINT \T. 
THE ''GROSS PROCEEDS'' ROYALTY S_HOlTLD 
xoT BE coxs·TR1ri£D AS H\TALGE OF RA''' OR.J~." 
Respondents assert that they have paid all royalty 
paytnents that are due, 'vhich they say have been based 
on ra\\., uraniwn ore Circular 5 p·rices. They so assert 
regardless of the fact that the royalty provision is based 
upon ''gross proceeds.'' 
If their reasoning is that Circular 5 prices control, 
that is fallacious for the reasons set out above under 
Point IV. 
If respondents' reasoning is that some indefinite 
''value of raw ore" controls, respondents are being in-
consistent, because because respondents themselves have 
not used the "value of ra\\., ore'' as a basis for royalty 
payments. This is evidenced by the following: 
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Under a "value of ra\Y ore" proVIsion, not only 
uranium but also vanadium and any other ores \Vould be 
the basis of royalty pay1nents, 'vhereas respondents have 
not paid for n1ost vanadium. 
Sales have never been 1nade by respondents at the 
1nine, but rather have been made at the mill; and costs 
incurred after the raw ore was produced, such as costs 
of concentrating by hand sorting, costs of transportation, 
etc., have neither been deducted nor are they claimed. 
No royalty has ever been paid at the time raw ore 
was produced. Ore has been mined and stockpiled with-
out payment of royalties. Royalty payments have been 
made only at the time of sale. Respondents thereby 
recognized that the language "proceeds of sale'' con-
trols as to the time the royalty accrues, but illogically 
urge that somehow it has no control as to the a1nount of 
royalty. 
POINT VI. 
A ROYALTY BASED UPON GROSS PROCEEDS 
FROM THE SALE OF ORE SHOULD HA \TE NO 
D·EDUCTIONS. 
The respondents cite many cases (Respondents' brief 
14-23) which they contend support the proposition that 
processiing charges should be deducted in computing 
royalty p~ayme·nts. What respondents failed to do, was 
to advise the court as to the nature of the royalty provi-
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sion~ being ronsidered. Obviously, the royalty language 
i~ all in1porta.nt. \Ve have no quarrel \vith the holdings 
in 1nost of the cases cited by respondents and think 1nost 
are proper interpretations of the oil and gas leases in-
volved. They are, however, neither controlling nor per-
suasive in the construction of our royalty p,rovision of 
Hgross proceeds of sale of ore." In fact none construes a 
royalty provision containing the word tdgross." Further-
more, they are oil and gas cases as distinguished from 
hard roek mining cases. 
Nearly all of respondents' cases on the point are con-
tained \vithin an annotation on "Oil and Gase Lease -
Compensation,'' 73 ALR 2d 1056. The annotation anal-
yzes the eases cited by respondents and others, which 
analy~is we shall not reiterate, but we shall point out 
the principal reasons why these cases are either not in 
point or not controlling. 
In Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 261 Ky. 840, 
88 s.,,7• 2d 989: 
The royalty language was ''proceeds," not "gross 
proceeds. " 
·The decision was partly based upon an accord and 
satisfaction. 
The decision was partly based upon evidence as to 
custom of the trade. There is no such evidence here. 
It was held the p,arties intende·d tihe market at the 
well to control rather than a distant market, whereas here 
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the place of sale of both ra\\~ and proce~~ed ore haf' been 
at a distant market, at the mill. 
In Phillips Petroleun1 Co. 1). Ochsner, 146 F.2d 138, 
the royalty language the court said it 'vas construing \Vas 
''market value at the well." T~he court refused to con-
sider "proceeds" of sale, because it said there \vas no sale. 
The court said: "Lessee did not sell the gas. It sin1piy 
traded it for an equal quantity of the same kind and of 
the same market value in another part of the field." The 
court said that a market value of gas used for gasoline, 
and not for light and fuel was established, and under the 
''1narket value at the well'' royalty provision ~'"rhere a 
market value is sho,vn, that controls." 
/The Phillips Petroleurn Co. t·. Record, 1-!6 F. :2d 485 
case shows that there \Vere, in fact, in all three of the 
Phillips cases two alternative royalty provisions: One 
was for a royalty for gas used for the manufacture of 
gasoline, which was based upon Bprevailing market rate 
for gas." The other \vas for gas used off the premises 
which was based upon '~gross proceeds." 
The court's reasoning in Record is difficult to follow 
as to which provision is applicable. The lower court had 
assumed that the market value provision \vas applicable 
and had so instructed the jury, to \vhich counsel took no 
exception, so that there was no question before the court 
as to the construction of the "gross prreeds" provision. 
~ehe court, however, does by way of dicta state that: 
''If, ho\\·ever, the district judge "~as " .. rong in 
this, and appellees, though not excepting, could 
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no'v question it, this would not advantage then1, 
for the gas which defendant got in exehange for, 
and, therefore, as proceeds of, plaintiffs' gas, was 
gotten for and applied to the same use, to be proc-
essed in a gasoline plant, and its market value 
for that use was no greater than, if as great as, 
that from plaintiffs' well." (Emphasis added.) 
This indicates that the court was reasoning that if the 
"gross proceeds" provision were at first applicable to 
the exchange of gas, that the "proceeds" in such an in-
stance were not money, but gas received in exchange; 
and that since exchange ''proceeds" gas was in turn used 
for the manufacture df gasoline, that then the ''prevail-
ing 1narket rate for gas" provision would become appli-
cable. 
The court then comes to the conclusion that unde.r a 
.. prevailing market rate for gas" provision, the pertinent 
market value was the market value of the gas received 
in exchange, and not the market value of the p-roducts 
manufactured from that gas. With such a conclusion we 
do not disagree. 
The court said that counsel argued that the royalty 
owner was entitled "to receive not one-eighth of the 
market value of the gas received in exehange, but one-
eighth of the market value of the products manufactured 
from the gas." This shows that not only the court but 
also counsel were applying the ''prevailing market rate 
for gas" provision, since had they been construing the 
"gross proceeds" provision they would have said, in-
stead, that they were entitled "to receive not one-eighth 
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of the market value of the gas received in ·exchange but 
one-eighth of the gross proceeds of the products manu-
factured from that gas." 
That this \Vas the rationale Is ~hown by the san1e 
Judge's decision in Phillips Petrole·unt Co. ~·. vflillianz.s, 
158 F. 2d 723, in which the court said: 
"The gas, for the royalty on "~hich they sue, 
was used for the manufacture of gasoline, the 
applicable royalty provision, therefore, is that for 
the payment of the 'p·revailing market rate for 
gas' and not that for "the payment of gross pro-
ceeds.' 
"On careful consideration of a royalty clause 
identical in language "\vith the claus-e in question 
~ere and of facts as to the use of the gas identical 
with those shown here.~ 1re so held 'tn Phillips 
Petrolerum Co. v. Record, 5 Cir., 146 F. 2d -±85.'' 
In Philli.ps Petroleu1n Co. v. Williams, 158 F. 2d 7:23~ 
the same royalty p-rovision of Hprevailing market rate 
for gas" was cons trued. The court said: 
"The gas, for the royalty on ,v,hich they sue, 
was used for the manufacture of gasoline, the 
applicable royalty provision, therefore, is that for 
the payment of the 'prevailing market rate for 
gas' and not that for 'the paynzent of gross pro-
ceeds'." 
It is app·arent therefrom that the court decided as it 
did because the 4 ~gross proceeds'' provision did not apply, 
the implication being that, had it applied, the actual sales 
price "·ould !have been used as the royalty basis, rather 
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than market value. These Phillips cas·es therefore sup-
port our po:-;ition and not respondents. 
In 1llat.zen c. Ilngoton Product,ion Co., 182 Kan. 456, 
321 P. 2d 576, the royalty language 'vas ~·proceeds from 
the sale of the gas." The royalty o'vner conceded that the 
royalty should be determined at the 'veil head and that 
the royalty owner s/hould pay reasonable expenses of 
gathering, processing and 1narketing the gas produced, 
where it was transported by the operator in its pip·e 
line off the premises and processed and sold. The royalty 
owner claimed that proceeds of sale meant the same thing 
as fair value. The operator claimed it meant proceeds 
of sale and that it could deduct its income tax therefrom. 
The royalty o'vner conceded that if it meant p·roceeds of 
sale tQtat it Ineant net proceeds but argued that taxes were 
not a deductible item. The lo,ver court used the "proceeds 
less expenses" theory and allowed no income tax deduc-
tion. This was affirmed on ap·p·eal the court holding that 
proceeds of sale control rather than value. This case 
construed "proceeds" as '~net p·roceeds'' but the import-
ant point is that it found that actual proceeds controlled 
over value. Had the language of the royalty been "gross 
proceeds," the result of this case would have been that 
actual proceeds control over value and no deductions 
could be allowed. This is the very point we are urging. 
The concurring opinion even states that counsel 
should not have conceded that there should be any deduc-
tion from the proceeds and had there been no such con-
cession the royalty owner could have recovered gross 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
proceeds even though the word "gross" 'vas not a part 
of the royalty provision. The concurring opinion states: 
"In view of the contentions of the plaintiffs 
that their royalty is detennined at the "Tellhead 
and their concession that they must bear a share 
of the reasonable costs of gathering, processing 
and marketing the gas produced, I concur that the 
judgment must be affirmed. I am in full accord 
that proceeds from the sale of gas is the measure 
of plaintiffs' royalty under the terms of the leases. 
However, I do not wish to be bound by the major-
ity opinion in the event an action ''"'ould be filed 
involving a royalty clause as is here presented and 
the plaintiff alleges, proves and here contends that 
royalty is determined from proceeds from the sale 
of gas without deduction of costs of gathering, 
processing and marketing. Proceeds of a sale, 
unless there is something in the context showing 
to the contrary, means total proceeds.'' 
In Freeland v. Sun 0£1 Co., 185 F. Supp. 75-±, 277 F. 
2d 154, there were again t\YO alternative royalty provi-
sions, one of which \vould be applicable depending upon 
1fue use to which the gas was put. One \vas based upon 
"the amount actually received." The other 'vas based 
upon "market value at the \Yell." Respondents in their 
brief at page 21 infer that this case eonstrues the "amount 
realized" provision. The court bases its decision upon the 
fact that it is the "market value'' royalty provision "rhich 
controls, and not the "amount realized" provision. This 
implies that had the applicable royalty provision ·been 
''amount actually received'' the result \vould have been 
that the royalty O\vner \\Tould have been entitled to the 
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~ro~s proeeeds 'vith no deductions. This again IS the 
prPcise point we are urging. 
In Cloyle ·r. Lo'ltisiana Gas & ]/uel Co., 175 La. 990, 
1-t--l So. 737, the royalty o'vner clailned a royalty on casing 
head gas from a gas well, expense free. The lease didn't 
expressly cover the situation but provided that as to oil 
one-eighth should be "free of cost," saying nothing as to 
the eost on gas royalty of "one-eighth royalty for the gas 
from each well where gas only is found.''' The uppe-r 
court held, at first, that no deductions should be allowed, 
but reversed the ruling on re-hearing and allowed the 
operator to deduct the cost ''to preserve the gas and its 
gasoline content by making both merchantable." The 
decision 'vas based upon the fact that the oil royalty pro-
vision expressly provided that the royalty should be "free 
of cost,'' wthereas, the gas provision made no such provi-
sion. The court reasoned that having expressly provided 
that it should be free of cost in one instanc.e, the sile·nce 
in the other instance implied that there should be a shar-
ing of cost. 
In our case there was no necessity to p·rocess uranium 
to make it marketable. There was a ready market for raw 
ore. Further, t!he provision for a royalty "free of cost'' 
is the equivalent of "gross.'' Since the Louisiana court 
based its decision upon the omission of the phrase "free 
of cost," the implication is that had such phrase been in-
cluded, the ruling would have been that no deduction 
for expenses could be made in paying the royalty. Tthe 
Louisiana court would, therefore, decide a "gross pro-
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ceeds'' royalty as meaning that the operator could not 
deduct expenses in making royalty payments. 
In Crichton v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 178 La. 57, 
150 So. 668, the royalty provision 'vas "market value." 
T'he op,erator had gas "rhich 'Yas impregnated with gaso-
line processed by a third party and received therefron1 
one-third of the product rendered marketable by process-
ing. The court held that the royalty should be based up-
on the one-third reeeived. This resulted in the court bas-
ing the royalty up,on the gross proceeds even though it 
was a market value provision, since one-third of the 
product 'vas all that the operator received. 
In Wall v. United Gas P~tblic Service Co., 178 La. 
908, 152 So. 561, the royalty language 'vas "market price.'' 
'The royalty holder claimed the royalty should be based 
upon sales price a"~ay from the 'veils. Evidence in the 
case showed what the market price in the field 'vas. The 
court held that the market price controlled over sales 
price at a distant market. The court distinguished t'vo 
cases on their facts saying, 
"Counsel for plaintiffs, in support of t'heir 
argument that 'market price' means the price at 
which the gas was sold cite the cases of Barton, 
et al v. Oil & jf £ning Co., 27 Old. 416, 112 P.965, 
and Ladd v. Uphan~ (Tex. Civ. App.) 58 S.,\:'". (2d) 
1037, 1038. 
''These cases do not support their proposition. 
The royalty clauses in those eases are not like the 
one in the ease at bar. In neither of the cases W'"as 
the lessee required to settle at the '1narket price' 
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of the gas. In the Barton case it \vas agreed that 
if gas "Tas discovered, the consideration to the 
lessor should be 'one-tenth portion of each gas 
well drilled on the premises herein described when 
utilized and sold off the premis·es.' The court in-
terpreted that to mean that the lessor was to re-
ceive a one-tenth portion of the proceeds of the 
gas when sold off the premises. 
'"In the case at bar, the lessor \Vas not to re-
ceiv·e a one-eighth 'portion of the proceeds \vhen 
sold off the premises,' but one-eighth of the market 
value of the gas. 
• ·In the I,jadd ease, the contract provided that 
'the lessee shall pay lessor as royalty one-eighth 
of the p·roceeds from the sale of gas as such'.'' 
The court \Yas distinguishing cas.e~s \vith royalty p·ro-
vi~ions si1nilar to ours. The implication is that had the 
court been confronted with our royalty language the ac-
tual proceeds \vould he the basis of the royalty with no 
deductions. 
In T"'" e.dder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 
50 Cal. .A.pp. 2d 102, 122 P. 2d 600, the royalty language 
'vas based upon the "value of all oil produced ... afte~r 
making the customary deductions for temperature, 
water" etc. 
This is simply a "value" case with which we do 
not disagree. 
Respondents argue that the court defined "oil" as 
meaning •'crude oil" and infer that is authority that 
"ore'' in our case means '•raw ore." In the Vedder case 
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the court based its conclusion, that oil n1eant crude oil, 
upon thirty-eigl1t references in the lease "'"here it clear-
ly could only 1nean crude oil. There is not one such 
reference in our instrument. 
Western G1.tlf Oil Co. v. Title Insurance Co., 206 
P .2d 643, is a cas-e similar to the , ... edder case. 
In Ree,d v Hacku:orth, 287 S.vY·. 2d 912, the royalty 
language was based upon "'gas produced". The lease 
was silent as to the place of market and the price of 
gas. The gas was piped t\\ro miles by the producer and 
sold by him for 25¢, 10¢ of \vhich was "'specifically ap-
portioned ... as the cost of piping." The court held that 
the royalty should not include the 10¢ for piping. The 
court s:aid : 
''If a lease is silent on the question, royalty 
should be based upon the 1narket value of the 
gas at the well. 
"Since the contract (of sale) explicitly recog-
niees .a price of fifteen ce uts, \\'"e think the appel-
le'e is entitle~d to a one-eighth royalty b.ased upo-n 
that price." 
~The court bases the royalty, even though a royalty 
in kind, upon market value, and bases that market value 
upon sales priee, saying that the cost of piping 'vas not 
p·art of the· sales price. 'V e do not see that the case is 
at. all in point for a" gross proceeds" royalty provision. 
In Danciger Oil & Ref'lneries, Inc. v. Hamill Dr·ill-
i11g ·Co., 171 S.W. 2d 321_, the royalty was based upon 
"market price" "rhich the court construed as meaning 
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1narket value of gas. The eourt said that if there ""'as no 
1narket then dvalue'' controls. This case is not in point 
for a "gross proceeds" provision. 
In l.~e()unu Oil G1o. r. Sntith, 306 S.vV. 2d 190, the 
royalty \vas based upon the price '"at the wells." There 
"ras no market for gas at the wells. In order to make it 
Jnarketable, gas \\"'as piped to a dehydration plant where 
it was then sold. All parties and the court assumed that 
the cost of dehydration at a distant dehydration plant 
"ras deductible under such royalty provision. The only 
question involved \\"'as ",~Ju~ther the c.ost thereof should 
be the reasonable eost, or the actual cost of dehydration. 
It is thus apparent that none of respondents' cases 
supports their proposition that expenses should be de-
ducted from a '~gross proceeds'' royalty, since the cases 
either construe a ·'p-roceeds'' royalty as net proceeds, 
or they construed a market value provision, under either 
of which, expenses are properly deductible. 
In addition to the cases cited by respondents, the 
reasoning of which s.upports our position that there 
should be no deduction from a gross proceeds royalty, 
the following four cases are of interest: 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, (5th Cir.) 155 
F.2d 185, 188, 198, holds that a "net proceeds'' royalty 
should not be construed as a "value'' royalty. The court 
said: 
"In so far as the gas was 'marketed' we think 
the stipulation for a share of the 'net proceeds 
derived' ought to be enforced, effect being given 
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to the 'vords 'net at the mouth of the well by al-
lo--w·ing as expense the cost of transporting, sepa-
rating, and marketing. This lessor ~did not cot~­
sen.t to be left to the uncertainties of 'fair value' 
or even 'market price' as to the gas, but was will-
ing to take one-eighth of wha.t the lessee sold vt 
for, relying on the lessee's interest to secure a 
good sale." (Emphasis added.) 
In Ladd v. Upham (Te.r. Civ. App.) 58 S.,\T. (2d) 
1037, 1038, the royalty 'vas based on ''p-roceeds from 
the sale of gas.'' In construing this. "proceeds" provi-
sion, the civil ap·peals court said: 
''In view of these exp·ress terms we feel un-
willing to say that the lessee would be compelled 
to deliver to the lessor at the mouth of the well 
any part of the gas produced. The lessee under 
the terms of the· lease was given full power and 
control of the entire production and if, in order 
to obtain a better price for the gas, he chose to 
construct pipe lines or otherwise to convey it to 
a point or poinrts beyond the lease and thus re-
ceive greater p·rofit, he could do ~o, hut could not 
escape the obligation in favor of the lessor im-
posed by the terms of the lease.'' 
This decision was cited with approval by this court in 
U. S. Sntelting, Refining <f Mining Con1pany v. Haynes, 
111 U. 172, 176 P.2d 6:2:2. The Texas Supre1ne Court 
affirmed this case, 95 S. \\T. 2d 365. In doing so, it indi-
cated that the cost of transportation to 1narket 1night be 
a deductible ite1n, thus eonsidering p·roceeds as possibly 
1neaning net proceeds rather than gross. Had the lan-
guagP been H gross proee·eds, '' as in our case, no such 
' 
'· 
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qualification eould logically have been Ina<le in affirming 
the decision. 
In Roberts v. f3u·anson, 222 S.W. 2d 707 (Tex. Civ . 
.1\ pp. 19±9), oil \vas to be delivered ''free and clear of 
all costs and expenses'' at the p~ipe line or other delivery 
point. It \\Tas delivered to a p~urchaser at a distant re-
finery rather than at the well. The court held that the 
cost of transportation was not deductible from the roy-
alty. 
HFree and clear of all costs'' is the equivalent of our 
"gross,'' and under neither should there be a deduc-
tion. If a deduction 'vere allowed for milling costs, there 
sli.ould just as logically be deductions for other costs 
such as sorting, transportation, etc. Even respondents 
don't claim other cost deductions, but illogically single 
out cost of milling as the only allowable deduction. 
Respondents selected the time of sale. They paid 
no royalty on stockpiled ore. Ore in its raw state was 
marketable, but for an advantage to the·mselves, they 
retained title to the ore through the processing stage. 
One consequence thereof was an advantage of a higher 
depletion allowance. Another consequence should be a 
disadvantage of a higher royalty payment. 
In State v. Hobart Iron Co., 143 Minn. 457, 172 
N.W. 899, 175 N.W. 100, 176 N.W. 758, the lease provided: 
"The lessee agrees to pay 'for all the iron ore mined 
and removed ... at the rate of 25c per ton .... '' The lo'v 
grade, unmarketable ore was washed in order to make 
the ore marketable, and was then sold. The court held 
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that, under the terrns of the lease, the parties intended 
that royalty should be based upon tonnage as mined 
rather than lesser tonnage after concentration by wash-
ing. At first blush, this cas.e might appear to be against 
appellants because it bases the royalty on tonnage prior 
to concentration. Ho\vever, that determination "\\"as rnade 
because of the peculiar language of the lease, not present 
in our case. The importance of this case is that the op-
erator bears the cost of concentration, with no sharing 
therein by the royalty owner. Furthermore, the court 
did not base its decision upon any contention that con-
centrated ore was not . ore, but assumed that both ore 
and concentrates were ''ore," and then looked to the lan-
guage of the lease to determine whether the royalty 
should be based on tonnage of ra" ... ore or tonnage of 
concentrated ore. 
POINT VII 
SALES OF CONCENTRATED ORE ARE SALES 
OF ORE. 
In arguing that concentrates are not ore, respond-
ents cite several cases upon which we comment as fol-
lows: 
In Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 29 L.Ed. 550, and 
Ozark Chemical Company v. Jones, 125 F.2d 1, 2, the 
following definition is given: 
Ore is a "compound of metal and so~e.other 
substance, as oygen, sulphur, or arsenic called 
its mineralizer by \Yhich its properties are dis-
tinguished or lost." 
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Respondent8, in their brief, emphasize the phrase 
''by \\'hich its properties are distinguished or lost." How 
thi~ helps respondents we fail to see, in that, as pointed 
out in our original brief, the prop·erties of uranimn are 
still distinguis:hed or lost whether the ore is in a raw 
or concentrated stage, because, in both, the mineralizer 
oygen is present, as evidenced by the fact that in sales 
of both ra"r and concentrated ore, contained U30s is sold. 
The co1npound does not have the properties of the rnetal. 
In an admiralty case of Arneri.can & Cub.an B.S. 
Linje, Inc. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co. 281 F. 725, a dif-
ferentiation is made bet,veen copper ore and cop·per con-
centrate because of the physical differences between 
them. The question decided was whether or not the terms 
of a charter had heen complied \vith, where the char-
ter provided for the haulage of ore. A surprised cap-
tain, \Yhose ship \vas equipped to carry an expected solid 
cargo, \Vas forced to accept a liquid slurry. During the 
voyage, a storm was encountered and the slopping cargo 
sank the ship. The decision was based upon exp·ert testi-
mony as to the nature of concentrates, none of which 
is present here. We do not contend that there is no dif-
ference between raw and concentrated ore as to their 
appearance and physical characteristics. Our contention 
is that ore includes both raw ore and concentrated ore. 
As pointed out in State v. Hobart Iron Co. (supra) 
the court, in construing a royalty based on "iron ore 
mined and removed" assumed that concentrated ore was 
"ore" and said that the concentrating ''results in mak-
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ing the mined ore in a practical sense and in the sense 
of the lease '1nerchantable shipping iron ore'.'' 
POIN'T \TIII 
WHEITHER OR NOT DEPLETION ALLOW AN,CE 
CAN BE TAKEN IS XOT AN ISSlTE. 
Respondents argue that appellants could not take 
an increased allo"\\rance, resulting fron1 an increase in 
price due to concentration, even if "proceeds of sale" 
was always applicable rather than just applicable in the 
future. They cite authority to that effect. The Internal 
Revenue Code has been amended since the decision cited, 
and there are contrary authorities. \\T e shall not cite 
such authorities because it is not an issue in this case. 
Suffice it to say that appellants think they can take a 
depletion, and a correct interpretation of the royalty lan-
guage would give the1n an opportunity to clai1n such a 
depletion. As a matter of fact, there is also a question 
as to whether or not respondents can prop,erly take such 
increased depletion, since 26 USCA 613 allo,vs it in the 
case o:f ''ores or minerals w·hich are not custo1narily sold 
in the form of the crude mineral product,'' so that re-
spondents would have to establish that uranium is not 
customarily sold in its ra'Y state, but rather that ore is 
customarily sold in its concentrated state in order to 
properly get increased depletion. Such an assertion is 
the exaet opposite of their assertion in this case. 
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CON·CLUSION 
Respondents advance no argument 1n defense of 
the lower court's ruling that dismissed the case, (when it 
had before it only motions concerning the basis of ac-
counting) other than that appellants either had not raised 
issues, or having raised them, had waived them. 'The 
record does not support them, but in fact shows that 
appellants claimed an accounting for the proceeds of 
sale ore, which would entail an accountin.g for vanadi-
um, as well a.s uranium; an accounting for fictitious 
haulage allo,vance, if the allowance in fact was a proceeds 
of sale; and an accounting as to the amount of proceeds 
regardless of the basis of the royalty. 
The respondents' contention that ''gross proceeds 
of sale of ore" does not mean what it says, but that it 
means there should be deducted from the proceeds cost 
of processing ore; or in the alternative that it means 
the value of raw ore, is not supported by any authority 
cited by them. To the contrary the very cases cited by 
respondents, and other cases, differentiate between ''pro-
ceeds" royalties and ''value'' royalties, and properly con-
strue them to give meaning to the plain language used by 
the parties. Deductions are allowed only if "gross" 
is not used, or if "value" is being determined. 
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The judgment should be reversed and appellants' 
motion for summary judgment should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DELANEY & BALCOMB and 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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